to the adverse criticism published in recent issues of The China Weekly Review concerning measures of local defense, together with the general tone of editorial comment on questions which concern the lives and property and general welfare of American citizens in Shanghai . . . (the) present policy of The Review appears to be in direct opposition to the opinions and views as held by the members of the Chamber . . . ."[85]

Powell refused either to tender his resignation or to change his policies. He further declared: "on the matter of American policy . . . (with which the Chamber appears to be in opposition) . . . I certainly have no intention of changing my views, which are, that the American people have no business or interest in intervening in the internal political affairs of the Chinese people. The (Chamber) . . . apparently believes in involving America in complications . . . which . . . may be far-reaching to the extent of another war."[86]

Had Powell ever felt alone in his stand against what he pictured as the forces of reaction in China he soon was accorded overwhelming evidence to the contrary. His skirmish with the Chamber, and the position he represented, won almost unanimous approval from the American press and expressions of support from throughout China and Shanghai which significantly reflected opinion crossing national and professional lines.[87]

More important, Powell was also justified in his assumptions on American policy in China. This portion of the debate which focused on the interpretation of United States policy raises the interesting question of just what was the American position during the 1925-27 period and the correctness of the interpretation of it rendered by the American adversaries in Shanghai. In light of Dorothy Borg's comprehensive work on the subject it is not necessary to dwell on this question here. Suffice it to say that the decision of the United States, and subsequently of all the Powers, to refrain from armed

retaliatory measures in the aftermath of the Nanking Incident upheld Powell's version.

For Powell, however, the weeks that followed held a broader meaning. He saw in the actions of the Powers not only the vindication of his own views and the end of the old "gun-boat diplomacy" but the start of a new era in East Asia. If the British, and their "die-hard" proponents were the villains in the plot against China, the United States and a "new deal" for China constituted the heroic elements in the situation. The events of the spring of 1927 signified to Powell the passing of European influence in the Far East and its replacement by the rise of American leadership and influence.

During the ensuing months The Review steadily offered more open and unreserved support to the Chiang-wing of the Kuomintang, a stance which became increasingly firm and which continued down to Powell's death twenty years later. For a while this continued to involve Powell in a running altercation with the American Chamber of Commerce and the North China Daily News and Herald, both of whom displayed an uncompromising hostility to the new government at Nanking and its supporters. The Daily News and Herald, moreover, persisted in prodding the Powers to change their policies toward China and even voiced the necessity for "taking the law into their own hands." if the home governments did not offer the proper government.[88]

However, the crucial questions of Shanghai and the Nationalist revolution which had provided the context and issues for the great debate of the preceding two years gradually passed into the background. For even as Chiang and the Kuomintang moved toward Peking and the completion of the revolution in China proper, the clouds of a new conflict with the Japanese cast an ominous shadow over the future. This new menace to China's sovreignty was to consume Powell's crusading energies

just as completely as had the issues just treated and eventually obscured the questions of treaty revision and the position of the foreigner in China.

IV. Conclusion.

The period beginning with John B. Powell's arrival in China (1917) and ending with the completion of the Nationalist revolution (1927-28) coincides with an important phase in Chinese history. In this era the hopes for achievement of a republican government which could unify China were shattered in the anarchy and disorder of the warlord period. China's domestic struggle was complicated throughout this period by the position and interests of the foreigner who looked on---not with indifference---from his privileged sanctuary provided by mid-nineteenth century treaty agreements.

However, the disillusionment these conditions fostered gradually gave way to renewed hope for the republic in the uncertain promise offered by the rise to power of the Nationalist movement. Shanghai and the International Settlement became inextricably involved in the issues which were a part of this revolutionary movement. There was no immediate solution for many of these problems, however, for Shanghai was involved in a struggle which became World War II. In the years immediately following the Nationalist triumph China set aside its drive for sovreignty to ward off the advances of Japan. The growing anti-foreignism associated with Nationalist aspirations was temporarily overshadowed by a renewed feeling of cooperation with the West in order to meet a common enemy, only to be revived by the communists after the Second World War. It was this ebullient situation into which Powell was transplanted and in which his journal, The China Weekly Review, was born.

Powell's background was far different from that of ~~the~~ most foreigners, Americans included, in Shanghai's International Settlement. The pragmatic approach, pervaded with a progressive spirit aimed squarely at monopolistic

vested interests in its own society, which Powell brought from the American Midwest was one which could more easily adjust to the changing conditions in China. The "Old-China Hand" was removed from any such experience and therefore immune to its influences. In many ways, the foreigner's position in China, not seriously challenged until the 1920's, was analagous to those who formed the target for reformers in twentieth century America. Powell temporarily succumbed to the artificially imposed society and institutions grafted by the foreign community onto the extremities of China.

But the force of events and the influence of his formative years in America rapidly transformed his thinking, prepared him for an understanding of the profound changes implicit in Chinese nationalism and disposed him towards the advocation of a "new deal" for China. In the process he came into conflict with foreign interests seeking to preserve a system fast becoming anachronistic in the face of nationalist demands for its abolition. The change in his outlook which brought him into this clash made Powell a leading figure in and interpreter of the Chinese scene. While many of his professional counterparts turned bitterly against China and its demands for an adjustment of Sino-Foreign relations, Powell retained the optimism inherent in his idealistic, muckraking spirit. His stand on the administrative and social questions in Shanghai (at the end of the period being considered) leaves little doubt that, in the context of time and place, Powell represented a progressive and far-sighted position sensitive to the needs and aware of the direction of a changing China. At the same time, in his proclivity toward perfectionist-type criticism and attacks, Powell serves to exemplify the fallacies of the liberal American's approach when applied without due regard to an alien society and tradition. Often, therefore, his ideals were not well enough suited to China to be effective. Whether the gap between stated

ideals and their translation into practice produced, in the end, more harm than good for Sino-American relations is a question this paper does not presume to answer.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to gauge Powell's effect both on his own immediate environment in China and vis-a-vis Americans in general. His attitudes and eventual views showed a marked coincidence with those of the then United States Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg and the approach taken by Washington. Moreover, his interpretation of American policy was essentially borne out in United States actions during and after the 1925-28 period. It cannot be said with certainty that Powell exerted an influence on American officials but it is likely that The Review was read both in the Department of State and by American government employees in China. Powell's impact on the American press, however, can be measured with greater assurance. His battle with the American Chamber of Commerce and, consequently, his position generally won widespread editorial support and commendation throughout the United States.

Powell's influence on the Chinese is a matter of conjecture. The fact remains, in any case, that The Review's largest audience were the English-reading Chinese, the intellectuals and students who comprised the key elements in Chinese society. Though it is not possible to accurately weigh Powell's impact on this important sector in China, it is not unreasonable to assume that to many Chinese his views reflected the American position in a sympathetic and favorable light.

Footnotes.

1. The China Weekly Review, April 30, 1927, 40: 220. (Hereafter cited as CWR.)
2. Ibid.
3. Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). Chapter II. Much of the material dealing with the progressive era has been drawn from this source. (Hereafter cited as Commager.)
4. New York Times, March 1, 1947 (United Press dispatch), 6; American Guide Series, Missouri: A Guide (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941), 17-20.
5. Commager, 95-98.
6. Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager, The Pocket History of The United States (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1956), 363-68. (Hereafter cited as Nevins.)
7. Frederic Arthur Culmer, A New History of Missouri (Mexico, Missouri: McIntyre Publishing Co., 1938), 523-41.
8. Nevins, 387-88.
9. Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism (New York: MacMillan Co., 1950). See section titled The Rise and Fall of Yellow Journalism, 1892-1914, 519-609. (Hereafter cited as Mott.)
10. Ibid, 575.
11. John B. Powell, My Twenty-Five Years in China (New York: MacMillan Co., 1945), 2. (Hereafter cited as Powell.); New York Times, March 1, 1947, 6. These are the only available sources found for data on Powell's early life.
12. Ibid.
13. Mott, op. cit., 604.
14. Ibid, 605.
15. The University of Missouri Bulletin (Journalism Series, No. 99), Deskbook of the School of Journalism, Sixteenth Series, 1944, 2.
16. Powell, op. cit., 2.
17. Ibid.
18. Powell, op. cit., 3-4.

Footnotes (cont.)

19. Ibid, 1.
20. Ibid, 8.
21. Julean Arnold, China: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook (Washington Government Printing Office, 1926), 514-515. This source gives detailed information for the Shanghai Consular District.
22. Powell, op. cit., 53-54.
23. Ibid, 71.
24. Ibid, 320.
25. Ibid, 338; New York Times, March 1, 1947, 6.
26. New York Times, March 1, 1947, 6.
27. Ibid.
28. Powell, op. cit., 11.
29. CWR, op. cit., June 4, 1921 (no volume number). The creed first appears in this edition of The Review. Although Millard retained some financial interest in The Review until 1922, Powell at this time was editor and publisher of the journal.
30. Powell, op. cit., 12-14.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. CWR, Nov. 1, 1925, 34; Extraterritorialty Issue is missing; Dec. 4, 1926, 39.
34. Powell, op.cit., 78.
35. Ibid, 83.
36. Ibid, 162.
37. CWR, June 13, 1925, 33: 39-40.
38. Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-28 (New York: MacMillan Co., 1947), 205. (Hereafter cited as Borg.)
39. See Borg, op. cit., 55, for explanation of the Sino-French gold-franc dispute which delayed the implementation of the Washington Conference agreements. The French refused to ratify the agreements until the dispute was settled.

Footnotes (cont.)

40. CWR, May 29, 1926, 36: 337-39.
41. CWR, April 3, 1926, 36: 107-8.
42. CWR, April 24, 1926, 36: 189-91.
43. CWR, May 15, 1926, 36: 280.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. CWR, July 4, 1925, 33: 88.
47. Ibid.
48. CWR, Aug. 15, 1925, 33: 207.
49. CWR, May 15, 1926, 36: 280.
50. Ibid; See also, CWR, June 12, 1926, 37: 25-26.
51. CWR, May 22, 1926, 36: 312-313.
52. CWR, May 15, 1926, 36: 280.
53. CWR, Jan. 23, 1926, 35: 205-6.
54. CWR, Dec. 19, 1925, 35: 63.
55. Ibid, 64.
56. CWR, March 19, 1927, 40: 58-59.
57. CWR, March 5, 1927, 40: 4-5.
58. CWR, July 31, 1926, 37: 203-4.
59. CWR, Sept. 11, 1926, Sept, 18, 1926, 38: 34; 59.
60. CWR, Sept, 18, 1926, 38: 60.
61. CWR, Nov. 6, 1926, 38: 257-59.
62. CWR, Aug. 7, 1926, 37: 231-32.
63. CWR, Oct. 9, 1926, 38: 145-46.
64. In view of the fact that there had been no declaration by any of the Powers at this time (other than the Washington Conference agreements over three years earlier) barring such an eventuality, Powell's faith is somewhat questionable.
65. CWR, Aug. 15, 1925, 33: 207.
66. CWR, Dec. 19, 1925, 35: 64.
67. CWR, April 16, 1927, 40: 169-70.
68. CWR, Feb. 26, 1927, 39: 330.
69. CWR, March 26, 1927, 40: 92.
70. Ibid, 92.

Footnotes (cont.)

71. CWR, April 9, 1927, 40: 142.
72. Ibid, 142.
73. CWR, April 9, 1927, 40: 142-43.
74. CWR, May 7, 1927, 40: 241.
75. Ibid, 241.
76. Borg, op. cit., 357.
77. CWR, May 28, 1927, 40: 339-40.
78. CWR, May 14, 1927, 40: 274.
79. CWR, April 30, 1927, 40: 217-18.
80. CWR, Aug. 8, 1925, 33: 180.
81. Borg, op. cit., 340-41.
82. Ibid, 343.
83. CWR, April 12, 1927, 40: 119-20.
84. CWR, May 14, 1927, 40: 274.
85. CWR, April 30, 1927, 40: 220.
86. CWR, May 7, 1927, 40: 244.
87. CWR, see issues during months of May and June.
88. Borg, op. cit., 360.